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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

RECENT CASES
DOUBLE JEOPARDY-TWO CRIMES ARISING FROM SINGLE
WRONGFUL ACT-POSSIBILITY OF SEPARATE
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES
The Supreme Court of Nebraska in the recent case of the State of Nebraska
v. Ieppesen, 154 Neb. 765, 49 N.W. 2d 611 (1951), held that the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy is not applicable against successive prosecutions
when two distinct offenses grow out of the same unlawful act.
Although the courts recognize that a single act may constitute two or more
distinct and separable offenses and the person charged may be punished for all of
them, they are not always in accord as to what constitutes distinct and separable offenses arising from a single act. Thus, the rules in the various states differ sharply
as to whether a single act resulting in the death of two or more persons may
constitute one crime or offense, or a number of crimes or offenses equal to the
number of deaths.' The Supreme Court of Nebraska in its above stated holding in
the leppesen decision has thus adopted the majority rule. Before the majority, minority, and Pennsylvania holdings on this subject are discussed the factual background
of the principal case should be considered.
The appeal was from the conviction of the defendant, Delbert Jeppesen, for
the crime of manslaughter for the death of Della Tordrup. The prosecution stemmed from an automobile collision or accident between an automobile driven by
the defendant and an automobile driven by Lydia Tordrup with her sister, Della
Tordrup, as a passenger. Both Lydia and Della were killed as a result of the collision, and the defendant was charged with manslaughter in two separate informations which were identical in form with the exception of the name of the person
kiiled. The defendant was tried for the unlawful killing of Lydia Tordrup and acquitted, but the defendant was then tried again, and, in this case, convicted of manslaughter for the killing of Della Tordrup. The defendant, at the trial for the killing of Della, pleaded the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy,2 contending that inasmuch as the one act, the collision, produced both deaths, and the
evidence relied upon by the prosecution in both cases were identical except for the
name of the person killed, the acquittal in one case was a bar to the prosecution on
the other information. The trial court overruled the defendant's plea of double jeopardy, and the defendant appealed from his conviction of manslaughter to the
Supreme Court of Nebraska.
That court upheld the trial court on this point, but reversed the decision
because the evidence was insufficient to sustain the judgment and conviction. In
upholding the trial court's denial of the defendant's plea of double jeopardy, after
citing the case of Warren v. States with approval, the court said,
1 172 A.L.R. 1062.
2 Nebraska Bill of Rights, Art. 1, § 12 of the Constitution of Nebraska as amended.
8 Warren v. State, 79 Neb. 526, 113 N.W. 143 (1907).
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". . . It is the identity of the offense, and not of the act which is referred to in the Constitutional guarantee against putting a person twice in
jeopardy. In the instant case, the same act caused the death of two different
persons. The only thing determined by the prior adjudication is that as
to Lydia Tordrup's death, the defendant's misconduct or negligence, if
such existed, was insufficient to fasten the guilt upon him . . .
Under this construction, if the wrongful act is the cause of separate and distinct offenses, there is nothing in either the Constitution of the United States or
that of Nebraska which would prohibit successive prosecutions.
The guarantee against double jeopardy is found in the federal Constitution
and in the constitutions of most of the states of the United States, and it is substantially the same in all. The federal guarantee is found in the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution, which states:
".... Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; . ..
The principle behind the double jeopardy provision of this clause is that a
person acquitted of a criminal offense shall not be prosecuted a second time for the
same offense. 5 It should also be noted that the guarantee is not limited by a strict
application of the phrase, "life and limb," but has been construed in the Federal
courts to apply to any criminal proceedings. 6 The plea of double jeopardy in their
courts requires an offense which is identical in both law and fact, and the federal cases have recognized that there may be more than one distinct offense arising
from one transaction. 7 Thus the federal courts, in construing the Constitution of
the United States, have adopted what shall hereinafter be referred to as the majority
view. It should be remembered, however, that the amendment is a restraint upon
the national government only, and not upon the individual states.8
With that limitation in mind, let us see what the states hold upon the problem
of the application of their own constitutional provisions to the problem of, "Does
the Constitutional provision against double jeopardy, in situations where more than
one offense has resulted from a single act of the defendant, apply to the act itself,
or to the offenses growing out of the act?" In other words, where a single act of
the defendant results in the death of two or more persons, is there one crime or
offense, or a number of crimes or offenses equal to the number of deaths?
The majority of the States hold that it is the identity of the offense and not
of the act which is referred to in the Constitutional guarantees against putting a
person twice in jeopardy. In other words, the majority holding on the controversy
4 Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
5 United States v. Gramer, 191 F.2d 741 (C.A., Wash., 1951).
6 United States v. Farwell, 76 F. Supp. 198 (D.C., Alaska, 1949). Clawans v. Rives, 104 F.2d
240, 7 App. D.C. 107, 122 A.L.R. 1436.

Slade v. United States, 85 F.2d 786 (C.C.A., Utah, 1936).
8 Com. ex rel. Wallace v. Burke, 84 A.2d 254, 169 Pa. Super. 633 (1951). People v. Derrico, 100
'"

N.E.2d 607, 409 Ill. 453 (1951).
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is that there are as many separate and distinct offenses as there are persons injured
or killed by the unlawful act, so that successive prosecutions may be installed against
the person who committed the unlawful act without violating the rule against double
jeopardy. In the State of Minnesota v. Fredlund,9 the court said:
"... But neither in the federal Constitution nor in our own constitution is there any prohibition against successive prosecutions if the wrongful act is the cause of separate and distinct offenses..."
The court then held that it is the identity of the offense and not of the act
which is referred to in the Constitutional guarantee against putting a person twice
in jeopardy, and, more specifically, where two or more persons are injured by a
single act, yet, since the consequences affect each person injured, there is a number
of separate and distinct offenses corresponding to the number of persons injured
ot killed.
In the State of Ohio v. Martin,10 where two persons were killed as a result
of a collision between their motorcycle and the defendant's automobile, and the
defendant was acquitted on a charge of second degree manslaughter for the death
of one of the two persons, the court said that the acquittal was not a bar to a prosecution for the death of the other person killed. The court held that each homicide
constituted a separate offense for which the defendant could be tried without twice
being put in jeopardy. Some of the leading majority states are Washington, Minnesota, Illinois, Oklahoma, Virginia, Massachusetts, Ohio and Nebraska."
The minority of the states hold that where two or more persons are injured
or killed by a single act of the defendant, only one offense is committed, and an
acquittal or conviction on an of fense based on the injury or death of one of the persons will be a bar to the prosecution of offenses based on the injury or death of
the other person. In the State of Iowa v. Wheelock, 12 three persons were killed in
one automobile collision by a single wrongdoer. The defendant was tried and acquitted of th'e first death, and when the state attempted to try him for the second
death, the court held that there was but one offense, the collision.
In the recent case of the State of New Jersey v. Pennsylvania Railroad,18
eighty-four indictments were returned against the defendant railroad company,
each charging that the railroad did kill and slay one of the persons killed in an
accident when a train operated by the defendant company was hurled from a
trestle over which it was traveling. The defendant objected on the ground that
there was but a single offense. The Supreme Court of New Jersey in holding that
there was but one offense committed quoted from the decision in the State v.
Cooper14 and said,
9 State v. Fredlund, 200 Minn. 44, 273 N.W. 353 (1937).
1f) State v. Martin, 96 N.E.2d 776, 154 Ohio St. 539 (1951).

11 State v. Taylor, 185 Wash. 198, 52 P.2d 1252 (1936) ; State v. Fredlund, n. 9; People v. Allen,
368 ill. 368, 14 N.E.2d 397 (1938), appeal dismissed in 308 U.S. 511, (1939) ; Fay v. State, 62
Okla. Crun. 350, 71 P.2d 768 (1937) ; Lawrence v. State, 181 Va. 582, 26 S.E.2d 54 (1943) ; Com. v.

Maguire, 313 Mass. 669, 48 N.E.2d 665 (1945) ; State v. Martin, n. 10; State v. Jeppesen, n. la.
12 State v. Wheelock, 216 Iowa 1428, 250 N.W. 617 (1933).
1s State v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 9 N.J. 194, 87 A.2d 709 (1952).
14 State v. Cooper, 103 N.J.L. 412, 135 A. 872 (1833).
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"... Some act of commission or omission lies at the foundation of
every crime. And, that a simple consequence of an act should be severed
from the act itself and possess independently all the necessary elements of
the crime is a violation of sound philosophy and law. ..
Some of the leading minority states are New York, New Jersey, Tennessee
and Iowa. 15
The position of the Pennsylvania courts16 on this question seems to be in
doubt, and the cases on point are rather few. The New Jersey Supreme Court in
the case of State v. PennsylvaniaRailroad17 cites the Co'mmofiwealth v. Ernesto18
as upholding the minority rule. But the American Law Reports, citing the McCord'9
and the Carrol20 cases, states that:
"In Pennsylvania when more than one offense is committed by a
single criminal act, a conviction
may be had on all the offenses, but there
21
can be but one sentence,"
which would, in fact, place Pennsylvania very close to the majority.
Perhaps a review of the leading Pennsylvania cases on this point would help
clarify the Commonwealth's position. In the case on the Commonwealth v. Veley,'2
the defendant was charged on three separate counts of manslaughter when three
people were killed by the breaking of a dam. The court held that there was but
one casual effect even though the result affected many parties, and thus there was
but one injury to the Commonwealth. The court said:
the criminalprosecution is for the injury to the Commonwealth,
and not for the injur done to the individuals, who may, if entitled, obtain
redress through a civil action. Where there is but one act of cause of
injury, or death of a number of persons, there is but one injury to the Commonwealth..."
The same result was reached in the Commonwealth v. Ernesto,23 where seven
persons were killed when an unlawful still exploded. The court used the same
language as in the Veley case and seemed concerned with the possible unjust results which might follow from allowing two prosecutions on one set of facts, emphasizing that there had been but one injury to the Commonwealth. In the case
of the Commonwealth v. McCord,2 4 the defendant while negligently operating an
15 People ex rel. Lalley v. Barr, 259 N.Y. 104, 181 N.E. 64 (1932) ; State v. Pennsylvania Railroad, n. 13; Smith v. State, 159 Tenn. 674, 21 S.W.2d 400 (1929) ; State v. Wheelock, n. 12.
16 Pennsylvania guarantees against double jeopardy are found in Art. 1 § 10 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, and in Act of March 31, 1860, P.L. 427, § 30, 19 P.S. 464. See also Com. v. Duerr,
94 P.L.J. 155, aff. 45 A.2d 235, 158 Pa. Super. 484 (1946).
17 N. 13.
IS Commonwealth v. Ernesto, 93 Pa. Super. 339 (1928).
19 Commonwealth v. McCord, 116 Pa. Super. 480, 176 A. 834 (1935).
20 Commonwealth v. Carrol, 131 Pa. Super. 357, 200 A. 139 (1938).

21 172 A.L.R. 1063.
22 Commonwealth v. Veley, 63 Pa. Super. 489 (1916).
23 N. 18.
24 N. 19.
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automobile ran into three pedestrians who were walking together, killing one and
seriously injuring another. The trial court tried and convicted the defendant of
both involuntary manslaughter and aggravated assault and battery. On appeal,
the superior court reversed the sentence for aggravated assault and battery, saying:
.....

By this single act unlawful injury was done to two persons, but

it consisted of but a single criminal act. While we can not sustain the assignments of error complained of in so far as they complain of the conviction, we think that the court, in all circumstances, had no power to impose sentence upon the charges of involuntary manslaughter and aggravated assault and battery for the one act ...

A similar situation arose in the case of the Commonwealth v. Carrol.2 5 Two
occupants of the defendant's automobile were killed and the defendant was charged
with involuntary manslaughter on two counts. The trial court charged the jury, in
effect, that the two cases were identical, and that if the defendant was guilty on
one, he would be guilty on the other; and if not guilty on one, he would be not guilty
on the other. The defendant was convicted on both counts, but on appeal the
Superior Court, after citing the Veley and Ernesto cases with approval, held that
since the same unlawful act caused both deaths, the imposition of double or consecutive sentences would have been improper. A somewhat different situation is
illustrated by the case of Com. ex rel. Garland v. Ashe. 26 The defendant by the
same act violated both a federal and a state statute. He pleaded guilty to the federal
offense, and, after his conviction by the Commonwealth, appealed on the argument
of double jeopardy, as both the state and federal offenses arose out of the same
act. The court said in upholding his conviction:
t
(the) fact that both charges refer to and grow out of one
transaction does not make a single offense where more than one are defined by the statutes..."
It seems very clear to this writer that in the past Pennsylvania has been following the theory of the minority rule. In all of the Pennsylvania cases discussed
above, the courts have emphasized the fact that where two or more persons are
killed or injured by a single unlawful act of the defendant, only one offense is
committed against the Commonwealth. The Veley and the Ernesto cases are clearly
minority rule. Although the McCord and the Carrol seem to speak of a distinction
in sentencing, both are based on the one offense theory. The Garlandcase illustrates
an 'exception where more than one offenses are defined by statute. It should be
noted, however, that there are not any recent Pennsylvania cases reported on this
point, but, on the basis of these past decisions, it appears doubtful that the Pennsylvania courts will discard their present position and adopt the majority holding
as illustrated by the principal case, the ]eppesen case.
James G. Park
Member of the Middler Class
2i N. 20.
26 Com. ex rel. Garland v. Ashe, 344 Pa. 407, 26 A.2d 190 (1942).
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CONSTITUTIONAL -LAW-GROSS RECEIPTS TAX ON INTERSATE CARRIERS-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GROSS
RECEIPTS ACT OF 1931 AS AMENDED IN 1951
In the recent case of Shirks Motor Express Corporation v. Otto F. Messner,'
the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas upheld 2 the constitutionality 4of the
Gross Receipts Act of 19313 as amended by the Act of December 27, 195 1.
One important question in this case, which is being appealed to the Pennsyl.vania Supreme Court, is whether the Gross Receipts Tax levied upon interstate commerce was properly levied as compensation for the use of the highways or, improperly levied as a mere revenue measure.
The plaintiff motor express corporation was engaged in the business of transportation by motor vehicle as a common carrier in interstate commerce, and as such,
was subject to the tax on its gross receipts as imposed by the Act of 1931 as amended in 195 1.1 The Act of 1931 is entitled "An act imposing a tax on gross receipts as
an excise on the use of the public highways by certain owners or operators of motor
vehicles transporting passengers and property for hire."
It is well settled that the authority of the legislature in levying taxes is broad.
However, it is the duty of the judiciary to interfere with such tax impositions, when,
as here, said impositions exceed the limits imposed by the Constitution.6 A long line
of United States Supreme Court decisions 7 has established the rule that a state may
impose taxes on interstate carrier's operations for the purpose of compensating
the state for highway regulatory and maintenance expenditures but it may not impose an excise tax for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. The bases
for this restriction on taxation are the limitations of the "Commerce Clause" of
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States. This principle was recently reaffirmed in Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 71 S. Ct.
508 (1951). Nor can the state exact a tax in the nature of a general revenue measure;
i.e., it cannot compel an interstate carrier to pay any part of the cost of facilities or
services not furnished for, nor used by, such carriers. 8
1 Shirks Motor Express Corporation v. Otto F. Messner, Secretary of the Department of Revenue
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Weldon B. Heyburn, Auditor General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, (Opinion not reported as yet).
2 No. 2015 Equity Docket; No. 34 Commonwealth Docket, 1952; August 25, 1952.
3 Act of June 21, 1931, P.L. 694, 72 P.S. 2183, et seq.
4 Act of December 27, 1951, Act No. 469.
5 See n. 4, supra.
6 See 11 Am. Jur. 892, § 192.
7 Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554, 47 S. Ct. 702 (1926) ; Capital Greyhound Lines v. Price, 339 U.S.
542, 70 S. Ct. 806 (1950) ; Interstate Buses Corporation v. Blodgett, 276 U. S. 245, 48 S. Ct. 230
(1927) and cases cited therein.
8 Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1914) and cases cited therein. See also Commonwealth
v. Ferrari, 114 Pa. Super. 290, 292 (1934) wherein it was stated:
"That they should pay their just share of the facilities furnished by the public and essential
to their use is only fair and equitable. The fees are not an excise on the privilege of engaging in
interstate commerce, but are based on actual expenses incident to maintaining highways, enforcing

statutes, etc."

RECENT CASES

It becomes apparent, therefore, that if the Gross Receipts Act of 1931 as
amended in 19519 was, by virtue of the amendment, made into a general revenue
measure or one imposing a tax for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce;
it thereby transcends the limitations imposed by the Commerce Clause.
An analysis of the facts behind the Act of 1931 and more specifically the
amendment of 1951 will clearly prove this Act to be a general revenue measure in
violation of said Commerce Clause.
The Act of 1931 imposed the tax in question upon the gross receipts of companies engaged in carrying passengers or property for hire over the highways of this
Commonwealth in motor vehicles; and it also provided in Section 9 that "taxes collected from companies operating intrastate shall be credited to the General Fund,
while taxes collected from companies operating interstate shall be credited to the
Motor License Fund." The latter distinction" between interstate and intrastate carriers indicates that the legislatures realized that it could tax interstate carriers solely
for the purpose of compensating the Commonwealth for Maintenance and policing
cf the highways, while as to intrastate carriers, the Commonwealth can impose an
excise on the privilege of engaging in such business. Thus, the intrastate taxes
collected went into the General Fund, while taxes collected from the interstate carriers went into the Motor License Fund, where they would be restricted to highway
purposes.
It has been a policy of long-standing with the General Assembly of Pennsylvania that where it levies taxes for the purpose of compensating the Commonwealth
for the maintenance and policing of its highways, it expressly provides for the
segregation and allocation of the proceeds therefrom to the Liquid Fuels Tax Fund
or the Motor License Fund, which funds are expendable only for highway purposes.
The trouble arose (and hence this litigation), when in 1951, the Act of 1931
was amended in several important aspects. Principally, the Act of 1951 amends Section 910 so as to provide that all taxes collected under the act (i.e., interstate and
intrastate carriers) shall be paid into the state treasury and credited to the General
Fund. Now the taxes upon interstate carriers are not to be used for highway purposes
but are to be spent for purposes wholly foreign thereto. No statute appropriates any
part of the General Fund for highway purposes. Now the interstate carrier must pay
a portion of the cost of services and bounties furnished others but not to it, and
from which it will not, and is not expected, to receive any benefit.
The Dauphin County Court, speaking through Judge Neely, stated that:
"(T) his argument (the 1951 amendment changing the disposition
of the tax payments from the Motor License Fund to the Genera[ Fund)
9 See n. 4, supra.
10 § 9 provides that taxes collected from companies operating wholly within the state shall be
credited to the General Fund, while taxes collected from companies operating interstate shall be
credited to the Motor License Fund.
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overlooks the very important point that as to intrastate transportation the
tax payments were always credited to the General Fund under the Act of
1931. The amendment of 195r merely allocates the taxes from interstate
transportation on the same basis as taxes had theretofore been allocated
from intrastate transportation. If it is true that the allocation of these payments from interstate transportation to the General Fund makes this Act
a general revenue measure in spite of the ex ress language used therein
to the contrary, then the intrastate tax which always went into the General
Fund under the 1931 Act must be considered as having been a general
revenue measure."
It is apparent, however, that the court also overlooks the very important point
that when the legislature passed the Act in 1931, they realized that as to a company
operating wholly intrastate the Commonwealth can impose an excise tax on the privilege of engaging in such business and accordingly such taxes collected from said
companies can rightfully go to the General Fund.'1
The Amendment of 1951 went further than this. Section 3 eliminates credits
for excise taxes paid to cities and registration fees paid to the state, which said
credits were provided for under the Act of 1931.12 This change is evidence that
the legislature no longer was interested merely in having interstate carriers pay their
fair share of highways maintenance and policing. Now these carriers are to be
taxed on their gross receipts regardless of the fact that they had paid vehicle registration fees in excess of this amount; and being no longer tied in with vehicle registration fees, this tax is now conditioned solely on the receipt of revenues in the conduct of the interstate trucking business during the year taxed ...

it is the privilege

of engaging in interstate commerce that is now being taxed!
The Dauphin County Court, in discussing various United States Supreme Court
cases on this point, stated that, "the important factor in determining the validity of
a tax on interstate transportation is whether the tax is levied for the uses of the
highways," and that, "the disposition of the tax ... is not controlling." This amazing

concept was partly based on the case of Clark, et al. v. Poor, et al.,13 cited in the
opinion, in which the Supreme Court of the United States said at page 557:
"... It is said that all of thl tax is not used for maintenance and repair of the highways; that some of it is used for defraying the expenses of
the Commission in the administration or enforcement of the Act; and
some for other purposes. This if true, is immaterial. Since the tax is as11

There is nothing unusual about this tax as evidenced by the case of Commonwealth, Appellant
v. Columbia Gas and Electric Corporation in 336 Pa. 209 (1939). Prior to 1935 both domestic
and foreign corporations were subject to the capital stock tax imposed by the act of June 1, 1889, P.L.
420, as amended April 25, 1929, P.L. 657. The tax had been held to be a property tax, but by
amendment in 1935, (May 16, 1935, P.L. 184) the legislature changed its old policy of levying
a property tax and created in its stead a franchise tax upon foreign corporations. Here is, therefore,
another instanre when the legislature has recognized that you have to tax different subjects in different ways in the same section of the tax act; i.e., a privilege tax on foreign corporations and a
property tax on domestic corporations in the same section of the tax act.
12 See n. 3, supra.
13 274 U.S. 554, 47 S. Ct. 702 (1926).
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sessed for a proper purpose and is not objectionable in amount, the use
to which the proceeds are put is not a matter which concerns the plaintiffs."
The reference, in the quoted language, to the use of tax revenues for "other
purposes" was clearly explained in the later case of Interstate Transfer, Inc. v.
Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183, 186, 51 S. Ct. 380, 381 (1930), where note 1 to the opin-

ion explains that the "other purposes" referred to in the opinion were the "general
expenses of the state motor vehicle department as distinguished from expenditures
specifically upon the highways."
Additional facts will add to the proof that this act, as now amended, is a
general revenue measure on its face, i.e. imposing a tax for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce and not an excise payment for the use of the highways;
thus transcending the limits of the Commerce Clause.
Did the Commonwealth actually need the additional money (an estimated
$19,000,000 for the 1951-1953 biennium) to be garnered through this amended
tax, for the purpose of compensating the state for the maintenance and policing
of the highways which the interstate carriers use? The answer is clearly a negative
one when consideration is given to the fact that revenues from the liquid fuels and
gross receipts taxes, miscellaneous highway revenues and federal aid have been
during the 1945-1947, 1947-1949, and the 1949-1951 bienniums, more than sufficient to meet all appropriations and all expenditures thereunder for all purposes of the Department of Highways. In fact, the cash balance in the Motor License Fund as of June 1, 1951, amounted to over forty-eight and one-half millions
of dollars. And the revenues from the same sources for the 1951-1953 biennium,
it is estimated, will exceed by several million dollars all appropriations passed by
the General Assembly for all of the above purposes during that biennium, so that
the balance will further increase by at least ten million dollars during the biennium.
Why then this additional tax burden on the interstate carriers of millions of
dollars? The answer is found in the Commonwealth's desperate need for additional
revenue for general fund expenses during the 1951 legislative session.
It is common knowledge that the Governor's recommended flat income tax to
cover a General Fund budget for the 1951-1953 biennium was not passed by the
legislature. Thus obligations such as the $60,000,000 bonus to ex-servicemen, $42,000,000 for school subsidies and retirement payments and $10,000,000 for additional State Authority needs, had to be met in addition to new expenses such as civil
defense, increased appropriations for school and colleges, and other projects and
public works.
After several unsuccessful attempts to raise the needed funds were made, a
"package" of revenue measures were enacted at the closing days of the 1951 legislature, designed to produce the additional revenue, and included therein was the
amendatory Act of 1951 to the Gross Receipts Act of 1931.
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By so amending the Act of 1931 in the dying sessions of said legislature, as
q part of this general fund raising purpose, surely the legislature transcended the
Commerce Clause of our Federal Constitution by compelling interstate carriers not
only to pay their own way but also to pay the way of others, who have no right to
call upon them for such payment. Said imposition of an excise tax against interstate commerce by a general revenue measure, in the author's opinion, leads the
way for states to destroy commerce between the states, and it is for this reason
our founding fathers gave commerce the protection of Section 8, Article I of the
U. S. Constitution.
Richard B. Wickersham
Member of the Senior Class

REAL PROPERTY-QUIETING TITLE-FORM OF ACTION WHERE
INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENT IS INVOLVED-RULE 1061,
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
A lower court case now waiting decision on preliminary objections in the
Pennsylvania Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas provides interesting
discussion on the question whether the Action to Quiet Title under Pennsylvania
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 10611 is the proper form of action where the
plaintiffs claim an incorporeal hereditament in land.
In the year 1751 the town of Carlisle, Pennsylvania, was laid out according
to the wish of Thomas Penn, then proprietor of Pennsylvania. 2 The earliest available map, attached as exhibit to the complaint and dated 1764 shows a "market
house" on the square of the plan of Carlisle.8 From that date, if the map is accurate,
or at any rate, from some date not much later until November 28, 1951, various
"market houses" were in use in this public square. In 1951 the market house was
condemned pursuant to the authority of the Department of Labor and Industry of
this state. On December 13, 1951, the council of the Borough of Carlisle decided
to advertise for bids for the demolition of said market house and on January 10,
1952, a bid was accepted, and shortly thereafter demolition began. On February
29, 1952, a complaint in an Action to Qui-et Title was filed in the names of four
citizens praying for a decree adjudicating the title to the market property including
use as a market and for no oth-er use or purpose whatsoever, subject to the rights
of the public to the surrounding streets and to the police power of the borough. 4
Preliminary objections were filed, after an extension of time was granted, on May
1 Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, p. 399, 12 P.S. Appendix.
2 Letter of Thomas Penn to Mr. Peters dated London May 30, 1750. Exhibit of plaintiffs' complaint.
8 Map of John Creigh, Exhibit "H" of plaintiffs' complaint.
4 Francis F. Bruker, George H. Reed, Elizabeth R. Crosby and Charles W. Link v. The Burgess and
Town Council of the Borough of Carlisle, No. 130, May term, 1952, Cumberland County Court
of Common Pleas.
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citizens praying for a decree adjudicating the title to the market property including
use as a market and for no oth-er use or purpose whatsoever, subject to the rights
of the public to the surrounding streets and to the police power of the borough. 4
Preliminary objections were filed, after an extension of time was granted, on May
1 Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, p. 399, 12 P.S. Appendix.
2 Letter of Thomas Penn to Mr. Peters dated London May 30, 1750. Exhibit of plaintiffs' complaint.
8 Map of John Creigh, Exhibit "H" of plaintiffs' complaint.
4 Francis F. Bruker, George H. Reed, Elizabeth R. Crosby and Charles W. Link v. The Burgess and
Town Council of the Borough of Carlisle, No. 130, May term, 1952, Cumberland County Court
of Common Pleas.
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28, 1952. Included in these preliminary objections was a demurrer alleging insufficient facts to maintain an Action to Quiet Title.
The plaintiffs in this case base their complaint on a dedication of the land
to use as a market house by means of documents, letters, maps, and secondary written material, their being no executed deed or grant to prove for what use, if any,
the land was granted. Dedication is the appropriation or gift by the owner of land
or an easement therein for use of the public. It may be 'express, where the appropriation is formally declared, or by implication arising by operation of law from the
owner's conduct and the facts and circumstances of the case. 5 For the purpose of
the discussion here, which is to consider the form of action available under the
facts, we shall assume that the dedication is valid under Pennsylvania law, for if
the plaintiffs fail to prove their only means of right in the land, their case will
fail in any form.
Rule of Civil Procedure 1061 provides:
"(b) The action may be brought
(1) to comp'el an adverse party to commence an action in ejectment;
(2) where an action of ejectment will not lie, to determine any
right, lien, title or interest in the land or determine the validity
or discharge of any document, obligation or deed affecting any
right, lien, title or interest in land;
(3) to compel an adverse party to file, record, cancel, surrender,
or satisfy or record, or admit to the validity, invalidity or discharge of, any document, obligation or deed affecting any
right, lien, title or interest in land; or
(4) to obtain possession of land sold at a judicial or tax sale.
Adopted June 25, 1946. Effective Jan. 1, 1947"
The plaintiffs, in their brief, state:
"Ejectment does not lie because the public, whom these plaintiffs
represent. have been in actual and continuous possession for upwards of
189 years, and were in possession at the time of bringing this action...:
possession that is to say, for the uses and purposes for which the
land was dedicated and to the extent of the claim made in this action,
i.e., for market purposes every Wednesday and Saturday."
The plaintiffs have not been in possession. The municipal authorities against
whom the action is brought have been caring for, renting space to third persons
in,and otherwise exercising control over the market property and in reality were
in possession at the time of the suit. The plaintiffs' qualification of the term "possession" in itself would seem to admit the actual possession in the defendants. The
plaintiffs, however, are correct that Ejectment will not lie. Ejectment only lies
where the defendant is in possession and the plaintiff is claiming a possessory
interest in the land itself rather than a mere right of user. 6 When the plaintiff is
5 McKinney v. Duncan, 121 Tenn. 265, 118 S.W. 683.

8 Bell Telephone Co. of Pa. v. Baltimore and O.R. Co. 155 Pa. Super. 286, 38 A.2d 732 (1944).
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asserting other than a possessory interest, some remedy other than Ejectment must
be employed. This writer believes that an Action to Quiet Title is a proper form
insuch cases.
The defendants' theory of the case is different. They claim in their preliminary
objections that Quiet Title will not lie for three reasons:
(1) The Action of Quiet Title takes in the form comprised in Quia Timet
at Equity and that since a writing is necessary for an Action Quia Timet it is necessary for an Action to Quiet Title. In quoting a lower court case from Perry County
the defendants state:
"Clouds which may be removed by a court of equity consists of
instruments or other proceedings in writing which appear upon the record
and cast doubt
upon the validity of the record title. (Italics supplied by
7
plaintiffs. )
A recent case before the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, decided after
the defendants' pleadings were filed clears up this point with reference to R.C.P.
1061. In it the superior court held:
"The city, according to its brief, claims a right, privilege, or franchise, not by virtue of an express grant but, as will appear, by the operation
of the doctrine of estoppel .. .Usually a franchise is classified as an
incorporeal hereditament ...Giving Pa. R.C.P. No. 1061 liberal construction, Pa. R.C.P. 126, we hold that the authority invoked the remedy
provided by that rule."8
No writing was held necessary to constitute a cloud on title.
(2) "It is only where the plaintiff is in possession of the land against which
a person not in possession makes claim or asserts title, that an Action to Quiet Title
will lie." In support of this contention the defendants cite only Buck v. Brunner,
167 Pa. Super. 142, 74 A.2d 528 (1950). The superior court in this case was
called vpon to decide an Action to Quiet Title in which the defendant was in
possession and the plaintiff was asserting a possessory interest in the land. The
court first stated, and rightly so, that "in such a case the plaintiff must bring an
action in Ejectment." The court then went on to cite Mildren v. Nye, 240 Pa. 72,
87 A. 607 (1913), and stated:
"It is only where the plaintiff is in possession of land against which
a person not in possession makes claim or asserts the title that an Action
to Quiet Title will lie: Rule(s) 1061 (to 1066) of the Procedural
Rules."
The decision in Mildren v. Nye, however, was based on section 2 of the Act of
June 10, 1893 (P.L. 415, 12 P.S. 1545), "An Act to Provide for the Quieting of
Titles," which afforded a remedy only to "persons, natural or artificial . . .
in possession of any lands.. ." (Emphasis supplied.)
7 Liddick v. Louden, 52 D. & C. 402 (1945), Judge Rice quoting from Trustees of Schools v.
Wilson et ux, 334 Ill. 347, 166 N.E. 55.
F Versailles Tp. Authority of Allegheny County v. City of McKeesport, Superior Court, July 17,
1952, 90 A.2d 581.
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In its latter statement, therefore, the court in Buck v. Brunner was erroneously
interpreting the 1947 Procedural Rules on the authority of a case which, although
a correct interpretation of the statute therein presented, is not broad enough to be
applied to Rule 1061. Moreover, Section 2 of the Act of 1893 was suspended by
the Rules of Civil Procedure of 1947. From a reading of the procedural rules it
does not appear that any possession is necessary for maintaining an Action to Quiet
Title.9
(3) The Action to Quiet Title under the procedural rules embraced only
those requirements of the Action Quia Timet in Equity and no other Equity powers. Goodrich and Amram state:
"Any form of equity -proceeding which is not an Action 'Quia
Timet' is excluded even though it may involve land titles or the clearing
of land titles ..."
It is true that Quiet Title does not include the power to issue injunctions or
to interpret trusts of land, etc., which powers are in other courts, but it has been
held to give the power to reform a deed 0 and under Rule 126 should be given a
broad and liberal interpretation. As one lower court case has put it:
"The new Action to Quiet Title now gives jurisdiction on the law
side of the court to undertake the removal of every type of cloud on title,
removing the last vestige of equitable jurisdiction in these matters . ..
It is obvious that Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 1061 do not apply to this cause of
action. Section 2 would seem to afford an entirely satisfactory basis for maintaining
the Action to Quiet Title under the facts in this case. No averment or proof of
possession in the plaintiff is required within the rules. No writing is called for.
In view of the purpose and wording of the Rules of Civil Procedure Section 2 is
applicable to any case where Ejectment will not lie regardless of any concurrent
available forms or statutory remedies. A remedy need not be exclusive. It is the
election of the plaintiff in many cases which decides the form under which the
case will be brought. As long as the facts put the case within the chosen form,
the plaintiff may proceed without objection.
It would seem also that Section 3 might be available to the plaintiffs here.
This section allows an action to be brought, "to compel an adverse party to ...
admit the validity . . . of, any . . . obligation . . . affecting any, . . . interest in
land." A claim by plaintiff under Section 3 would provide ample relief and would
avoid any controversy over possession, Ejectment, Quia Timet, writing, etc. The
words "Document, obligation or deed" appear to refer to three types of proof
of the interest in land involved-deed to a sealed writing, document to any other
real evidence, and obligation to non-documentary evidence such as user, easement
9 R.C.P. 1065, Specific Averments. The only averment required is: "The plaintiff shall describe
the land in his complaint."
10 Tomina v. Costello, 76 D. & C. 505, 64 York Legal Record 195, 98 Pitts. L.J. 330.
11 Concannon v. Haile, 22 Northumberland L.J. 113.
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by custom, or dedication without express grant of the type herein involved. As
thus interpreted, Section 3 would support the plaintiffs' Action to Quiet Title.
The primary objective of modern procedural law is to do away with unnecessary
formality. Too much time has been taken up in the courts determining procedural
matters while the litigating parties suffer delay. Under Rule 1033, (R.C.P.)
amendments may be made in pleadings to the extent that the cause of action or
d'efense may be changed completely, and Rule 126 (R.C.P.) states:
"The rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action
The new Action to Quiet Title was promulgated for just such purpose. It
should not be hampered by retrogression to procedural formality. We must remember that the substantive rights of the parties are paramount. Procedural formality
should not be viewed as an end in itself, but always as a means to a speedy, efficient adjudication of rights.
Mary Ann Spence
Member of the Middler Class

BILLS AND NOTES-FICTITIOUS PAYEE-PAYEE NOT IN EXISTENCE
In the case of Callaway v. Hamilton National Bank of Washington,1 the question of fictitious payees was flatly put to the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, on
a set of undisputed facts. Briefly, these were the facts:
Callaway, who lived in Alexandria, Va., decided to invest in a business carried on by Peter and Bernice Hoeksema in Illinois. Callaway and
Hoeksema made an oral agreement whereby Hoeksema would form the
corporation of "Peter Hoeksema Inc." and transfer his business assets to
such corporation. Callaway was to invest ten thousand dollars cash and
receive one-third of the stock. Hoeksema was to prepare the necessary
papers for incorporation and organize it under Illinois law. Callaway was
advised that the corporation would be formed and operating by a certain
date. Callaway issued five checks payable to the corporation drawn on
the defendant bank. They were issued as payments on his ten thousand
dollar investment and were as follows:
(1) Check Number 1-Issued when the corporation was not in existence
and when Callaway knew it was not yet in existence.
(2) Checks Number 2 and 3-Issued when the corporation was not yet
in existence, but when Callaway thought that it was so in existence.
(3) Checks Number 4 and 5-Issued after the corporation was in existence and when Callaway knew it was so in existence.
1 195 F.2d 556 (D.C. Circuit, 1952).
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All of the checks were indorsed in the corporate name and were honored by defendant. In fact, Hoeksema had indorsed the checks and had
dissipated the money. Callaway now says that the indorsements are not
those of the named payee, i.e., forgeries, hence the defendant bank is
liable for its failure to pay the checks on the valid order of the named
payee. Defendant bank claims that the checks are bearer instruments because they are payable to a fictitious payee under Section 9(3) of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, 2 hence the forged indorsements are of no
consequence. Defendant did not fare well with this contention.
Where Payee Is in Existence and Drawer Knows It and Intends the Named
Payee to Benefit.
As to Checks 4 and 5, the court said that the fictitious payee rule did not
apply "because at the time of their issuance, the organization of 'Peter Hoeksema
Inc.' had proceeded to a point where, by Illinois law, its corporate existence was
beyond challenge except by the state." This holding is in accord with Pennsylvania
law in this situation.' This, of course, is the ordinary situation where a check is
issued to a named payee. If effect were not given to the intent of the drawer, no
check would be safe.
Where the Payee Is Not in Existence and the Drawer Does Not Know It, but
He Intends the Named Payee to Benefit.
As to Checks 2 and 3, the court held that they too were not payable to a fictitious payee because Callaway did not know of the non-existence of the corporation.
The knowledge of Hoeksema that the corporation had not yet been formed was
beld not imputable to Callaway for the reason that Callaway had not made him
his agent. Even if Hoeksema was an agent of Callaway, his knowledge would not
be imputable to Callaway because Hoeksema was acting for his own benefit and
not the benefit of Callaway in delaying the formation of the corporation. Consider
now the situation one step removed from this.
Where the Payee Is Not in Existence and the Drawer Knows It, but He Intends
that Such Named Payee Benefit.
As to Check 1, the court said that it was payable to a fictitious payee because
Callaway knew the corporation was not in existence at the time he drew the check,
even though he intended the corporation to have the benefit of the check. The
court recognized that in the reverse situation, however, Callaway's intent would
govern-if the named payee were an existent person but the drawer intended he
should receive no benefit from the check, the payee would then be a fictitious person.
The reason given by the court for the rule as to Check 1 was ". . . such a rule
In Pennsylvania the Act of May 16, 1901, P.L. 194 ch. 1, art. 1, § 9, 56 P.S. 14. "14 ... The
instrument is payable to bearer:
2

3. When it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person, and such fact was
known to the person making it so payable; . . ."
8 National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Mellon National Bank, 276 Pa. 212 (1923).
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would permit a depositor knowingly to draw checks to fictitious payees and then
shift the loss to an innocent party upon the subsequent failure of some hoped for
circumstance to materialize."
.

.

.

.

.

.

Why should this distinction be made? Is the drawer's intent any different in
nature in this situation? Or is the rule based on something other than a difference
in the nature of the intent in the two situations? Three things should be considered
in reaching a conclusion in this matter.
First. The mere fact that the named payee is not in existence is not the
governing factor. This is vividly illustrated in this case. Checks 2 and 3 which
were issued before the corporation was formed, but when Callaway thought it was
in existence, were held payable to the corporation, not bearer paper. Yet Check 1
was held to be bearer paper. Obviously too, the intent of the drawer that the
named payee benefit from the checks is not the governing factor. Apparently,
thL test is the knowledge of the payee's existence or non-existence. It may be
argued in support of this test that the literal wording of Section 9(3) makes it the
test. This argument would have borne great weight- when the act was first adopted,
but today, after the interpretations of the section by the courts are considered, this
argument wtakens. For example, it is practically unanimously stated by the courts
that the test in fictitious payee cases is the intent of the drawer. The act does not
mention intent. Further, in Pennsylvania, the word "fictitious" is interpreted as
meaning a person "feigned or pretended," and "non-existent" person is interpreted
as being "one who does not exist in the sense that he was not intended to be
the payee by the drawer."'4 Under the definition of "non-eiistent" person, the
intent of the drawer is the test, not the actual existence of non-existence of the
payee. If an actually non-existent person fits into this definition at all, it is through
the interpretation of "fictitious" in the form of "feigned," if feigned is used in the
sense that it means unreal or not genuine.
Second. What is the reason behind the rule giving effect to the drawer's
intent where he intends the named payee to have no interest in the check? By
giving effect to the drawer's intent, the instrument is made payable to bearer. Hence
the innocent bank is protected to the detriment of the drawer who is not so innocent
because he created the situation. To give effect to his intent in the situation presented by Check 1 would be to protect him at the expense of the innocent bank.
This, of course, is open to the argument that it is a one-way rule. The tendency,
however, is to give greater protection to the banks in view of their obvious disadvantage in this situation. There appear to be no Pennsylvania cases on point. Wre
find language in other Pennsylvania fictitious payee cases to the effect that the
"sole test of whether the payee is a fictitious person... is the intent of the draw4 Commonwealth v. Globe Indemnity Co., 323 Pa. 261, (1936).
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tr in inserting the name of the payee," 5 and "... . the guiding consideration is the
intent of the drawer ... in inserting the name of the payee .... "6 Will Pennsylvania follow this in the situation where the drawer knows the payee is not in existence? Perhaps the policy of protecting the drawee bank will override this "intent"
test. In this respect, it may be noted, however, that in a similar situation this policy
had little effect. 7
Third. In order to give effect to Callaway's intent that the corporation should
benefit from the proceeds of the check, it is not necessary that the corporation be
held to be the payee as such. When Calaway drew the check payable to the corporation prior to the time it was to come into existence, he could have had in
mind one of at least two methods of carrying his intent into effect.
He could have intended that the corporation as such be the payee. If this is
true, he knew the corporation could not authorize an agent to indorse the check
until it came into existence. To effectuate this intent, delivery of the check prior
to the corporate existence would have to have been conditional. There is no evidence
of a conditional delivery here. In fact, Callaway sent the check prior to the date
upon which the corporation was to be formed. Thus, it could be strongly argued
that he did not intend that the corporation as such be the payee.
If Callaway did not intend that the corporation as such be the payee, it is quite
possible that his intent was that the check was to be cashed by Hoeksema and
used for the benefit of the corporation. The check was a payment on his ten
thousand dollar share in the corporation. In the light of the agreement with Hoeksema, and Callaway's entrusting the entire formation and management of the
corporation to Hoeksema, it is highly probable that he intended that Hoeksema
cash the check immediately and apply it to the initial expenses of the venture. If
Callaway so intended Hoeksema to cash the check, then Hoeksema, not the corporation was the intended payee, and his indorsement would be valid notwithstanding the fact that he misappropriated the proceeds.
Undoubtedly, the situation where a check is drawn to the order of a corporation in the process of being formed is not rare. The rarity is in the fact that
the problem is seldom presented to the courts. When such a problem is presented
to the courts, it is not difficult to see why the desired result is often apparently irreconcilable with the results and language of other fictitious payee cases. Much of
this is due to the fiction of "bearer" employed by Section 9(3), and the interpretation placed upon that section by the courts. More often than not, the hardship falls
on the innocent drawee bank. Under the American Law Institute's Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) much of this difficulty would be removed.
5 Penna. Co. for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities, to Use of Royal Indemnity Co. v.
Federal Reserve Bank of Phila., 30 F. Supp. 982. Snyder v. Corn Exchange National Bank, 221
Pa. 559 (1908).
6 Bacher v. City National Bank of Phila., 347 Pa. 80, (1943). Industrial Loan Corp. v. Wyoming
National Bank, 41 Luz. L. Reg. 456 (1951).
' Spies, Banks and Banking-Forged Checks, 56 Dick. L. Rev. 121 (1951).
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Under the U.C.C.
The Uniform Commercial Code provides in Section 3-405:8
"3-405-Imposers; Signature in Name of Payee.
(1) An indorsement by any person in the name of a named payee
is effective if: * * *

b. A person signing as or on behalf of a drawer intends the
payee to have no interest in the instrument; . . ."
Note that here the intent of the drawer or the person acting in his behalf is
the governing factor, not the existence or non-existence of the named payee. Apparently then, under the literal interpretation of this section, all of the checks
in the Callaway case would have been order instruments, including Check 1, and
the indorsement of anyone but an authorized agent of the corporation would have
been a forgery. The drafters of the U.C.C. had this to say in "COMMENT" concerning this section:
"The words 'fictitious or non-existing person' have been eliminated
as misleading, since the existence or non-existence of the named payee
is not decisive and is important only as it may bear on the intent that
he shall have no interest in the instrument ....
".. . The test stated is not whether the named payee is 'fictitious' but
whether the signer intends that he shall have no interest in the instrument ..
"
Note that under the U.C.C., the fiction of "bearer" paper is discarded. Instead, the instrument becomes good "order" paper, and an indorsement by anyone
is effective. Under Section 9 (3), the fictitious payee doctrine is applicable to notes
as well as drafts, but because of the use of the word "drawer" in the U.C.C., it
applies only to drafts. There are no other major changes made by the U.C.C. concerning the problem before us. It does not appear from the illustrations of the
drafters of the code that any distinction should be made where the drawer knows
the payee is not in 'existence. The U.C.C. was not designed as a panacea, but it
does take a stride toward making the law more certain and uncomplicated.
Anthony C. Falvello
Member of the Senior Class
CONTRACT-INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACT TERMSMEANING OF "WAR" IN TERMINATION CLAUSE
OF INSURANCE CONTRACT
In a recent case, Harding v. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Insurance Co.,1 the
Pennsylvania Superior Court was confronted with the question, what is the legal
status of thL- action in Korea?
8 Uniform Commercial Code, Official Draft (Text and Comments Edition) (1952).
1 171 Pa. Super. 236, 90 A.2d 589 (1952).
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Catherine Harding, a minor, by her guardian brought an action in assumpsit
to recover double indemnity where her husband was killed in a railroad accident
while enroute to camp for military training.
The policy provided in part as follows:
"Termination:-These provisions for the additional accidental
death benefit shall immediately terminate: .. . (b) if the insured shall at
any time, voluntarily or involuntarily, engage in military, air or naval
service in time of war; . . .,'2
The court readily disposed of appellee's contention that at the time of insured's induction into federal service, September 5, 1950, the United States was still
technically at war with Germany, Italy and Japan, by referring to a presidential
proclamation declaring "that the hostilities have terminated," 8 and a joint resolu4
tion of Congress officially declaring the war's end.
The second phase of appellee's argument, to wit, that the United States was
at war with Korea at the time of insured's induction into federal service, presented
a bit more difficulty.
The question is not only one of first impression in this Commonwealth, but
seems to be one not heretofore raised in the reported decision of any appellate
court, either federal or state. The nearest approach to it is in Youngstown Sheet
and Tube Co. v. Sawyer.5
The court quoted from Mr. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in the Youngstown case. The quotation follows:
"That seems to be the logic of an argument tendered at our barthat the Presidenthaving, on his own responsibility,sent American troops
abroad derives from that act 'affirmative power' to seize the means of
producing a supply of steel for them. To cuote, 'Perhaps the most forceful illustrations ofthe scope of Presidential power in this connection is
the fact that American troops in Korea, whose safety and effectiveness
are so directly involved here, were sent to the field by an exercise of the
President'sconstitutionalpowers.' Thus, it is said he has invested himself
with 'war powers.'
"I cannot foresee all that it might entail if the Court should endorse
this argument. Nothing in our Constitution is plainerthan that declaration
of a war is entrusted only to Congress. Of course, a state of war may in
fact exist without a formal declaration. But no doctrine that the Court
could promulgate would seem to me more sinister and alarming than that
a President whos'e conduct of foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled,
and often even is unknown, can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal
affairs of the country by his own commitment of the nation's armed forces
to some foreign venture. I do not, however, find it necessary or appropri2

Ibid. at p. 237.

8 No. 2714, 12 F.R.I.-Code of Fed. Regs. 1946 Supplement, Titles 1-8, p. 77.

See also United States v. Anderson, 9 Wall. 56, 76 U.S. 56, 19 L.Ed. 615 (1870).
5 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. et al. v. Sawyer, Sawyer v. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. et
al., 72 S.Ct, 863 (1952). These are the so-called "Steel Seizure Cases."
4
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ate to consider the legal status of the Korean enterprise to discountenance
argument based on it." (Italics added.)e
The court then stated that there seems to be general agreement that the conflict in Korea is not declared war, and proceeded to the question of whether it is
undeclared war. That there is a marked distinction between the two was first pointted out in Bas v. Tingy7 and most recently in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Durham.8
In the latter case the New York Life Insurance Company issued its policy of insurance on the life of Lewis Durham, conditioned that the amount payable would be
the restricted amount if the death of the insured should occur "'while... in the
military . . . forces of any country engaged in war... '(W)ar' includes undeclared war." As stated in the opinion of the court: 9
"... The existence of war and restoration of peace are determined
by the political departments of our government, and such determinations are conclusively -binding upon the courts in all matters of state or
public concern... But in all private matters, unaffected by public interest, the partiesare undoubtedly free to contract with reference to war and
to give it such definition, connotation and meaning, as does not infringe
upon public policy."10
There, the parties by including undeclared war chose not to use the word "war"
in its technical or formal sense, but rather in the practical and realistic sense in which
it is commonly used and understood.
...

In the instant case, the court said that if the parties intended to include undeclared war, as was done in the Durham case"' and in the Stinson case,' 2 they
should have said so. The contract presumably was prepared by competent insurance company attorneys, who, no doubt, were familiar with the most recent decisions relating to war risk provisions in insurance contracts. If the parties do not
agree otherwise, said the court, words or phrases used in a contract of this nature
are used and intended to be used in the legal sense.18 And war in the legal sense
does not include undeclared war."4
The court reasoned that since there is a valid, recognized distinction between
declared and undeclared war as used in insurance contracts, the use of the term
"war" in the case at bar presents an ambiguity.
That being the case, the cardinal rule of construction, that where a policy
is susceptible of more than one construction it must be liberally construed in favor
of the insured and against the insurer, applies.
6 Ibid. at p. 873.
4 Dallas 37 (1800).
8 166 F.2d 874 (1948).
9 Ibid. at p. 875.
10 See cases collected in Annotation 168 A.L.R. 685.
11 N. 8.
12 167 F.2d 233 (1948).
13 The rule applicable here is stated in 17 C.J.S., Contracts, p. 717 § 300.
14 See Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, vol. 44, p. 624.
7
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For the purposes of the present case the court held that even if the action in
Korea constituted war, it was at most an undeclared war, not a war in the technical
sense in which that word was used in the exemption clauses of the policy. 15
The action in Korea has nowhere officially been referred to as a war.1 6 The
political department of the government has made no determination that it is a
war. And a court cannot take judicial notice of a war by its government until
there has been some act or declaration creating or recognizing the existence of
17
war by the department of the government clothed with the war-making power.
Howard L. Kitzmiller
Member of the Middler Class

15

Accord: Beley v. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Insurance Co., 171 Pa. Super. 253, 90 A.2d 597
(1952), decided the same day as the instant case. There recovery under double indemnity provisions
was allowed although insured was killed in action in Korea.
16 The United Nations calls it a breach of the peace. See U.N. Doc. s/1501 (June 25, 1950).
17 67 C. J., War, 336.

